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Greece and its creditors have been engaged in a two-month standoﬀ over the release of further
ﬁnancial assistance to the country. Lorenzo Codogno and Paul De Grauwe write that with no
agreement yet reached, the possibility of Greece leaving the euro has now become real. They
argue that the only solution to the crisis is for both sides to compromise, with the Greek government
accepting deep supply-side reforms, and Eurozone policymakers oﬀering Greece a fair deal on the
demand-side.
The Greek crisis has reached a new climax. The probability of a Greek exit from the Eurozone has
now become real. Yet, after the Greek elections it appeared that people with common sense could
come to an agreement. There was a new Greek government that wanted to get rid of corruption. In
particular, in contrast with the previous Greek governments, it was eager to reform the tax system
so that the rich Greeks would pay taxes. There was also a growing recognition within international
institutions, such as the IMF and the European Commission, that the intensity of the austerity
programmes imposed on Greece had gone too far and had pushed the Greek economy into a deep
economic depression with unacceptable levels of unemployment rates.
A deal between the new Greek government with the creditor countries seemed possible. Such a deal could have
been based on two pillars. Measures taken by the new Greek government to reform the tax system and a relaxation
of the intense austerity programme. But such a deal proved particularly diﬃcult because both sides around the
negotiating table showed a disturbing lack of common sense and an unwillingness to arrive at a compromise.
Yet a compromise is necessary and possible. It should be based on the long-term beneﬁts for the overall Eurozone
and not just short-term ﬁxings or kicking-the-can-down-the-road. Moreover, beneﬁts should be weighted carefully
against potential risks. In particular, the risks implied by the Grexit option appear signiﬁcantly underestimated these
days. Outright Monetary Transactions and Quantitative Easing by the European Central Bank provide a much
welcome backstop, but may also introduce complacency and a false sense of security over any possible contagion.
First of all, Grexit would be a political defeat for the idea of a peaceful Europe that aims at furthering integration and
prosperity for all. It would also be an admission of defeat: after eight years into the crisis European policymakers
would exhibit their inability to deal with the problems of a country that accounts for well below 2 per cent of Eurozone
GDP.
Secondly, Grexit would represent a permanent blow to ﬁnancial and economic integration. If investors not only
perceive the risk but also have the proof that leaving monetary union is possible, then they would start pricing it on a
permanent basis. Historical experience of countries de-pegging or leaving a currency area suggests that a 50 per
cent devaluation is not inconceivable. Even if you place a small probability on such an event, it would justify sizeable
spreads on member-countries’ debt.
Third the redenomination risk that would become a permanent feature of the new Eurozone would lead to
widespread ﬁnancial retrenchment and would make a mockery of the Capital Markets Union launched recently by
the European Commission. It would also undermine the banking union. The reason is that banks and corporations
would view across border exposures as risky despite the fact that they are denominated in the same euros.
Would the CFO of a French, Italian or Spanish company dare to issue a bond in euros when a redenomination could
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cause the company to go under? Would a company invest outside its own country when there is a high uncertainty
about the future denomination of its investment? There would certainly be a fundamental rethink of taking these
borrowing and investment decisions within the Eurozone. If that happens ﬁnancial and monetary integration would
be set back, and could even lead to the end of the single currency. Crises would become a chronic feature of the
Eurozone, very much as was the case in ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
How to get out of this problem? It all comes down to supply and demand. The Greek government should explain to
the Greek population that structural reforms, even the most diﬃcult ones, are in the best interests of citizens. While it
is probably true that Greece’s legislated reform eﬀort is the strongest among OECD countries, it is also equally fair
to say that the starting position was relatively weak and that implementation is still lagging. The Greek government
must accept deep supply-side reforms and show commitment. Recent openings by the Greek government on a
major pension reform would go in the right direction.
On the demand side, Eurozone policymakers should oﬀer Greece a fair deal. If there is a credible commitment to
structural reforms, they should oﬀer an aggregate demand environment in which reform can more easily be
introduced and their expected eﬀects can take hold. This should come in the form of a more gradual ﬁscal
consolidation, i.e. a reduced primary budget surplus, inclusion in the ELA and QE programmes by the European
Central Bank and ﬁnally some near-term help in restoring credit ﬂows in the domestic economy (while respecting EU
rules on state aid). Some ﬂexibility is again of essence for an economy that has shrunk by 26 per cent and is in the
process of creating a lost generation.
Such a two-handed approach based on a willingness to make compromises would be for the greatest long-term
beneﬁt of Greece and the Eurozone as a whole.
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